Authoritarian Social Control

Authoritarian regimes often rely on targeting - unequal application of the law to isolate internal "enemies." At the same time, modern autocrats' methods of social control appear less draconian than those in the past. This study analyzes a dynamic model of authoritarian control. In the model, a regime uses the threat of asset confiscation to limit "deviant" behavior. Confiscation is targeted: it varies across citizens' types and wealth holdings. The regime's commitment to a confiscation scheme is time-limited and depends on imperfectly informative signals of citizen behavior. In equilibrium, wealthier citizens are more compliant and face lower confiscation rates. The wealth distribution bifurcates. In the long run, a citizen becomes either a fully compliant "lackey" or a destitute, noncompliant "prole." This results in extreme inequality in wealth and polarization of expressive behavior. In a growing economy when discount factors are high enough, the regime sacrifices short run compliance to obtain greater control in the long run. Less punitive confiscation allows more citizens to accumulate enough wealth for the regime to enforce full compliance. In a stagnant economy, however, authoritarian control results in destitution and non-compliance in the long run. The results suggest an explanation for why authoritarian regimes often produce polarized, sclerotic societies, and why conditions needed for a prosperous, tolerant society under authoritarian rule are fragile