Background risk in the principal-agent model
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ligon, James Allen ; Thistle, Paul D. |
Published in: |
The Geneva risk and insurance review. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X, ZDB-ID 2197992-3. - Vol. 38.2013, 2, p. 115-126
|
Subject: | risk aversion | moral hazard | incentives | contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Theorie | Theory | Risiko | Risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikomodell | Risk model |
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