Bank Insolvencies, RegulatoryForbearance and Ambiguity

Banking regulators often practice forbearance and ambiguity in insolvency resolutions. The paperexamines the effects of regulatory forbearance and ambiguity in a context of allocational efficiency.Bailouts, liquidations and their stochastic policy mix lead to suboptimal allocations if banks do notinternalize insolvency costs. The policy of forbearance may make banks internalizing such costsand improves the efficiency of intermediation....

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Year of publication:	2006-09-01
Authors:	Vinogradov, Dmitri V.
Institutions:	Alfred-Weber-Institut für Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften <Heidelberg>
Subject:	Insolvenz \| insolvency \| Effizienz \| Ambiguität \| ambiguity \| Stundung \| forbearance \| Knappheit \| banking

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Extent:	328704 bytes 27 p. application/pdf
Series:	Alfred-Weber-Institut - Publications Discussion Paper ; No. 431(2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; Management of financial services: stock exchange and bank management science (including saving banks) ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868460