Bargaining with evolving private information

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation, and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Ortner, Juan
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 18.2023, 3, p. 885-916
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Bargaining \| Coase conjecture \| evolving private information \| inefficient delay \| two-sided private information

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4841 [DOI] 1856108198 [GVK] RePEc:the:publsh:4841 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D42 - Monopoly ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536929