Blowing the Whistle

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Apesteguía, José ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Selten, Reinhard
Institutions:	Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra
Subject:	Anti-trust \| leniency \| immunity \| amnesty \| blow the whistle \| cartels \| price competition \| Bertrand model \| experiment \| communication

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in The text is part of a series Documentos de trabajo - Lan Gaiak, Departamento de Economía, UPNA Number 0303 33 pages
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067339