Bonus payments and reference point violations

We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ockenfels, Axel ; Sliwka, Dirk ; Werner, Peter
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Reference points \| incentives \| bonus payments \| job satisfaction \| job performance

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 4795
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	621207233 [GVK] hdl:10419/35845 [Handle]
Classification:	D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269395