Boomerang Effect of Incentive and High Remuneration on Independence of Board Members

In this article, the author deals with two issues related to the setting of adequate remuneration of independent members of board of directors. The first concerns the justifiability of negotiating variable remuneration, while the other deals with the issue of providing high pay. In both cases, the remuneration can render stimulative effects on the performance of independent directors. However, apart from the usual problems triggered by variable and high remuneration, these forms of compensation pose an additional problem in the case of independent directors – the possibility of compromising their independence (the so-called boomerang effect). The author of this article does not justify a priori the banning of certain variable remunerations or the provision of high remuneration of independent board members. He merely supports the idea that the extent to which such pay could impair the independence of each individual director should be determined individually