Border Carbon Adjustments

Views on the use of Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) diverge but the strategic implications figure prominently in the debate. In this paper I examine how BCA policy design affects government incentives to regulate emissions and trade in a strategic setting. In particular, the paper examines if, and how, the importer can use BCA to induce a tightening of unilateral climate policy at home and abroad. Using a standard one-sector, two-country partial equilibrium model with climate damages from emissions, I examine BCA in a game where the emission taxes of the importer and exporter are chosen endogenously. I show that the impact of a BCA is not necessarily the adoption of more stringent climate policy. The outcome is determined by the extent trade is restricted by the BCA, the level at which trade partners set their respective emission taxes, and the effectiveness of the BCA in addressing both foreign and home's leakage. The paper also identifies the difference between a BCA and a carbon tariff in terms of their ability to leverage climate policy in a strategic setting