Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more deserving workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Addison, John T. ; Barrett, Charles Richard ; Siebert, William Stanley
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Betriebliche Sozialleistungen \| Sozialrecht \| Sozialpolitik \| Allokationseffizienz \| Theorie \| separating the various worker types

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 1866
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	504099485 [GVK] hdl:10419/33673 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276658