"Buying a pig in a poke": An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.

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Year of publication:	2005-11
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Ockenfels, Axel ; Weiland, Torsten
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Subject:	Ultimatum \| Dictator \| Fairness \| Veto power

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Papers on Strategic Interaction.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	17 pages
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588018