Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Year of publication: |
2016
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Authors: | Angelova, Vera ; Regner, Tobias |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |
Subject: | asymmetric information | principal-agent | expert services | deception | sender-receiver game | reciprocity | reputation | experiments | voluntary payment | competition |
Series: | SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; 2016-027 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 867096403 [GVK] hdl:10419/148863 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-027 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General ; I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets |
Source: |
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Angelova, Vera, (2016)
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera, (2018)
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Angelova, Vera, (2017)
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Angelova, Vera, (2016)
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Angelova, Vera, (2017)
-
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera, (2018)
- More ...