Can Labor Markets Help Resolve Collusion?

We show that, in a multi-agent contract setting, the principal can effectively rule out tacit collusion among agents (i.e., “bad” equilibrium) by posting permanent job openings to an external labor market. That is, a simple “market-like” employment mechanism can yield collusion-proof contracts

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Bertomeu, Jeremy
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (7 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 95, pp. 355-361, 2007 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 14, 2007 erstellt
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D2 - Production and Organizations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J4 - Particular Labor Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187025