Carbon Trading and No-Permanency of Agricultural Sequestration: Institutional Design and the Choice of Working Rules

The institutional development of a domestic carbon trading institution in Canada that includes carbon off-sets must address the problems of providing the appropriate incentives to generate carbon reductions and removals and the problem of non-permanency of sequestered carbon. The paper analyzes two rule sets to address these problems and estimates the economic impact of these sets.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Thomassin, Paul J.
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Environmental Economics and Policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA Number 21364
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005483647