Central bank and government in a speculative attack model
Year of publication: |
2013-09
|
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Authors: | Cappelletti, Giuseppe ; Esposito, Lucia |
Institutions: | Banca d'Italia |
Subject: | global games | complementarities | signaling | self-fulfilling expectations | multiple equilibria | crises | regime change | policy interactions |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 934 |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit ; E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook ; F3 - International Finance |
Source: |
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Angeletos, George-Marios, (2005)
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Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps
Angeletos, George-Marios, (2005)
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Angeletos, George-Marios, (2007)
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The management of interest rate risk during the crisis: evidence from Italian banks
Esposito, Lucia, (2013)
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Central Bank and Government in a Speculative Attack Model
Cappelletti, Giuseppe, (2013)
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Central bank and government in a speculative attack model
Cappelletti, Giuseppe, (2013)
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