CENTRAL WAGE SETTING UNDER MULTIPLETECHNOLOGICAL EQUILIBRIA: A MECHANISMFOR EQUILIBRIUM ELIMINATION

Instituting an initial round of centralized wage setting before an ultimate round ofdecentralized wage bargaining may raise actually raise employment. A general multiequilibriummodel is presented with strategic complementarities in theimplementation of a new technology through aggregate demand spill-overs.Centralized wage setting in establishing an outside option wage, which is selectivelybinding on lo-tech firms, may achieve the "big push" to a hi-tech general equilibriumwith higher employment, output, wages and profits.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Roberts, Mark
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Komplementarität <Wirtschaft> \| Mindestlohn \| Tarifverhandlung \| bargaining \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Unvollständige Konkurrenz \| imperfect competition

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Extent:	312320 bytes 25 p. application/pdf
Series:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 02/01
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1360-2438
Classification:	J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Ergonomic job analysis ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868947