CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

A multiple activities principal-agent model regarding CEO compensation in cooperatives is presented, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and that they have to bring the enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. A cooperative dominates a publicly listed firm in terms of efficiency when either activities are sufficiently complementary, or additional information is considered in the performance measure.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Li, Feng ; Hendrikse, George W.J.
Institutions:	International Association of Agricultural Economists - IAAE
Subject:	cooperative \| CEO compensation \| performance measure \| Agribusiness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China Number 51619
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010880062