Chapter Seventeen. Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Le Breton, Michel ; Weymark, John A.
Published in:	Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISBN 0-08-092982-6. - 2011, p. 191-299
Subject:	social choice \| Arrow's Theorem \| restricted domains \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Theorie \| Theory \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/S0169-7218(10)00017-1 [DOI]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025191