Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

Shuhei Morimoto; Shigehiro Serizawa; Stephen Ching

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness. -- strategy-proofness ; several infinitely divisible commodities ; uniform rule ; separable preferences

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Morimoto, Shuhei ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Ching, Stephen
Publisher:	Osaka : Inst. of Social and Economic Research
Subject:	Güter \| Goods \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (31 S., 287.31 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research. - Osaka : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2435-0982, ZDB-ID 2106942-6. - Vol. 769
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/92677 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929953