Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

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Year of publication:	2009-01
Authors:	Shellshear, Evan
Institutions:	Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld
Subject:	cooperative game \| core \| stable set \| fuzzy coalition \| fuzzy game \| core stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 410 14 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227286