Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Shellshear, Evan
Publisher:	Universität Bielefeld
Subject:	Stable set \| Fuzzy coalition \| Cooperative game \| Core \| Fuzzy game \| Core stability

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Type of publication:	Other
Language:	English
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452563