Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Shellshear, Evan
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Core \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Fuzzy Sets \| Theorie \| Cooperative game \| Stable set \| Fuzzy coalition \| Fuzzy game \| Core stability

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Series:	Working Papers ; 410
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	595211569 [GVK] hdl:10419/43811 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272595