Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Pauly, Marc |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 75.2013, 4, p. 581-597
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Subject: | Social choice theory | Referendum | Voting rules | Strategy-proofness | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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