Cheating alone and in teams

Alexander Dilger

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.

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Year of publication:	Januar 2021
Authors:	Dilger, Alexander
Publisher:	Münster : Institut für Organisationsökonomik
Subject:	Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Kollektives Handeln \| Collective action \| Betrug \| Fraud \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten)
Series:	Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik : [DP-IO]. - Münster : IO, ISSN 2750-4476, ZDB-ID 2580542-3. - Vol. 2021, 1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/229960 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; z20 ; z22
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427356