Cheating : One Common Morality for Gain and Losses, but Two Components of Morality Itself

Previous studies show that decision makers lie more to avoid a loss than achieve a gain. Two compelling mechanisms might explain this observation. One assumes that lying is a risky activity, and relates to the shape of the monetary value function described by prospect theory, which assumes: (1) increased risk-taking for loss frames, and; (2) an asymmetry between the perceived values of losses and gains. The other relates to the importance of self-esteem functions as expressed in self-concept maintenance models, self-esteem issues being weighed against monetary issues. This alternative explanation assumes that a loss frame serves as a factor lowering moral considerations. We report an experimental study presenting sets of lotteries to decision makers (DMs), once in a moral context and once in a traditional probabilistic context. The results show that DMs take less risk when lotteries are presented in a moral context. It is also shown that DMs take more risk for losses than gains, this holding for both the moral and probabilistic contexts. This latter result suggests that loss/gain asymmetry can be completely explained by prospect theory factors, while framing makes no difference to the valuing of moral considerations