Within the field of international relations, global environmental governance is frequently discussed in terms of “international regimes,” defined as “social institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, and programs that govern the interaction of actors in specific issue areas” ( Young, 1997, pp. 5–6 ). Viewed from the regime theory perspective, nation-states are seen as territorially bounded entities with a monopoly on the use of (economic or military) force ( Agnew, 1999 ). As a result, they are assumed to have primary authority in matters of global environmental governance. It is nation-states that engage in the negotiation of international treaties (in which the elements of a regime may be formalized), which are then taken home to be either implemented or ignored as the nation-state sees fit. Given that political power is defined by state boundaries within the regime approach, the internal politics of nation-states is considered to be of relatively little import in much of the literature. Aside from some interest in the concept of sovereignty ( Litfin, 1998 ), the notion of transgovernmental coalitions ( Risse-Kappen, 1995 ; Slaughter, 1997 ), and two-level games ( Putnam, 1988 ), in the main the state remains conceived as a homogenous and unitary actor, a “fixed territorial entity…operating much the same over time and irrespective of its place within the geopolitical order” ( Agnew & Corbridge, 1995, p. 78 ). While a recent focus on knowledge and the role of nonstate actors in international regimes has led to a revision of the nature of interests, politics, and influence, the state remains defined in terms of national government, albeit with potential internal conflicts and the roles of domestic actors noted. Implicitly, regime theory assumes that subnational governments act under the (sole) influence and direction of national government. Critically, the potential role of subnational government is either ignored or subsumed within the nation-state.
