Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Dimitrov, Dinko ; Haake, Claus-Jochen
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Koalition \| Spieltheorie \| Coalition Formation \| Paradox of Smaller Coalitions \| Semistrict Core \| Simple Games \| Winning Coalitions

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 72.2006
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	517019086 [GVK] hdl:10419/73904 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.72 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312256