Coalition formation in the airport problem

We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Farrokhi, Mahmoud
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Koalition \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Shapley-Wert \| Gleichgewichtsstabilität \| Flughafenbau \| Theorie \| Cooperative games \| Coalition formation \| Stable coalition \| Shapley value \| Airport Problem

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Series:	Working Papers ; 416
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	595211720 [GVK] hdl:10419/43779 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272565