Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

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Year of publication:	2008-01
Authors:	Soubeyran, Raphaël ; Rouvière, Elodie
Institutions:	Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Collective Reputation \| Entry \| Minimum Quality Standard

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2008.7
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; H41 - Public Goods ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Q18 - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965188