Comment on social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments

Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also decline because people only partially match their own contributions from previous periods. We discuss possible interpretations.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Smith, Alexander
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 923-931
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Public Goods \| Conditional Cooperation \| Dynamic Panel Data Methods

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C9 - Design of Experiments ; H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278589