Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments
Tobias Cagala, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke, Simeon Schudy
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Cagala, Tobias ; Glogowsky, Ulrich ; Rincke, Johannes ; Schudy, Simeon |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1090-2473, ZDB-ID 1467668-0. - Vol. 143.2024, p. 179-190
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| Subject: | Cheating | Commitment | Commitment request | Compliance | Lying | No-cheating declaration | No-cheating rule | Truth-telling | Experiment | Mitarbeiterbindung | Employee retention | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014449968