Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.

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Year of publication:	1998-09-08
Authors:	Volij, Oscar
Institutions:	Oscar Volij
Subject:	Asymmetric Information \| Core \| Common Knowledge

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic theory and game theory.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Game Theory 29, 63--79 (2000)
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178285