Compensation of Powerful CEOs

We consider a model of executive compensation in which CEOs have power to influence their compensation and test its implications using CEO compensation data from Execucomp. In the proposed model, CEOs endogenously determine their equity and salary compensation by maximizing the expected utility of their compensation while fulfilling minimal obligations to shareholders. Results from the empirical study with 3,012 CEO-years over 1992-2001 provide evidence that rent-seeking plays a significant role in the determination of CEO compensation. Estimated responses of CEO compensation (total, equity and salary) are consistent with the comparative statics of policy rules from the rent-seeking compensation model. The model and empirical study provide an alternative analytical framework for studying the determinants of CEO compensation and give useful policy insights into the interplay between managerial compensation and investor welfare

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Gehr, Adam ; Pandher, Gurupdesh S.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Macht \| Power \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Lohn \| Wages

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2005 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1916347 [DOI]
Classification:	G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256616