Competing Auction Houses

We consider a model where sellers make repeated attempts to sell an object via two competing auction houses. An auction house that attracts a seller runs a Vickrey auction among a random sample of buyers and collects two fees: a listing fee and, if the object is sold, a closing fee. We characterize equilibria and show that two equilibrium outcomes are possible: a (contestable) monopoly, and a market segmentation between the two competitors.

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Year of publication:	2009-04
Authors:	Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Institutions:	Kyiv School of Economics
Subject:	Competing auctions \| mediator \| listing fee \| closing fee

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Under review in Games and Economic Behavior Number 17
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970829