Competing Combinatorial Auctions

We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in their demands, with some having synergies for items. We find that, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead, the competing auctioneers will segment the market by restricting allowable package bids in order to increase competition between bidders. This shows that it might not be advantageous for an online market platform to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to competing auctioneers.

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Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Kittsteiner, Thomas ; Ott, Marion ; Steinberg, Richard
Published in:	Information Systems Research. - Catonsville, MD : The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, ISSN 1526-5536. - 2021, Ahead of Print
Publisher:	Catonsville, MD : The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Subject:	Competing auctioneers \| Combinatorial auction \| Electronic marketplace \| VCG mechanism

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1287/isre.2021.1018 [DOI] hdl:10419/240927 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:espost:240927 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012617840