Competition, efficiency, cost allocation changes, and quality in government agencies: Evidence on the Federal Reserve
This dissertation examines the extent to which government managers respond to competition and fee-for-service requirements by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government agencies or by modifying cost allocation methods. I examine this issue in the context of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the United States Federal Reserve System. Using data from the Fed's internal cost accounting system, I find strong evidence that competition and requirements to set fees based on reported costs motivated substantial improvements in both the cost and quality of Fed services. I also find strong evidence that competition and fee-for-service requirements motivated numerous allocation changes in the Fed's cost accounting system which redirected costs away from the Fed's more competitive services. Taken together, the evidence suggests that competition may provide an important tool in the nation's current efforts to "reinvent" government, with some consideration necessary for competition's influence on managerial incentives and the uses of and validity of the data reported by the cost accounting system.
|Year of publication:||
|Authors:||Cavalluzzo, Ken Sal|
|Type of publication:||Other|
Dissertations available from ProQuest
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009439006
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