Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees.
In this article, the author intends to justify the rare use of application fees in labor markets. He analyzes a model in which there is a training or testing period preceding a worker's effective production period. With various commitment abilities of firms, the author finds that application fees are used if and only if all future wages can be committed before a worker applies; otherwise, no application fees will be charged. The model is then modified to explain the positive fees in journal submissions and college admissions. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Wang, Ruqu |
Published in: |
Journal of Labor Economics. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 15.1997, 1, p. 124-42
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
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