Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation.
The authors report successive rounds of theory and laboratory experiments investigating price-taking behavior and market efficiency. They focus on the impact of structural parameters as well as trading institution. The structural parameters involve noncompetitive supply and demand, and a new odd-lot trading procedure for divisible goods. The trading institutions include the continuous double auction and the one-shot clearinghouse as well as a new quantities-only clearinghouse institution. The authors present and justify an as-if complete information theory that explains the competitive outcomes and that correctly predicts highly noncompetitive outcomes in quantities-only clearinghouse markets. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Friedman, Daniel ; Ostroy, Joseph |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 105.1995, 428, p. 22-53
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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