Complementarities in employment dispute resolution systems : bigger bang or just bigger bucks?

Organizations face increasing pressure to improve internal conflict management, which has led to experimentation with different types of dispute resolution components. These include: Rights-based processes, in which third-parties determine the outcome of a dispute based on laws, contracts or standards of behavior; Interest-based neutrals, who manage the dispute resolution process and leave decision-making authority to the parties themselves; and Negotiations, which include all efforts by individual disputants to resolve conflicts themselves. Anecdotal evidence suggests that systems combining all three types of dispute resolution components are more effective than any of the individual or pairs of components. To date, however, there is no theoretical explanation or rigorous empirical evidence to justify the regular implementation of full dispute resolution systems by organizational leaders. In this dissertation I present and test two competing theoretical models to explain the benefits of dispute resolution systems over pairs and individual components. The first is an additive model, in which the more types of components that are available, the more types of disputes that can be managed. The second model is a complementarities model, in which none of the components can operate effectively without reinforcement from the other types of components. Thus, performance benefits accrue only when a full system is implemented.