Compromise Stable TU-Games

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Quant, Marieke ; Borm, Peter ; Reijnierse, Hans ; van Velzen, S.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	game theory \| bankruptcy

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2003-55
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090315