Consequences of Vertical Separation and Monopoly : Evidence from the Telecom Privatizations

Two common policy instruments used by governments around the world to increase the availability of basic telephony (i.e., local, long distance, and international service) have been: (1) award monopoly rights on basic services to cross-subsidize residential local telephony; and (2) separate vertically (i.e., structural separation) the owner of the local fixed network from the provider of long distance or international telephone services. I use data from a panel of 67 countries during the seven years following the privatization of the telephone monopoly and find that contrary to wide spread beliefs: (1) monopoly on basic services is not associated with lower residential telephony prices; quite the opposite, monopoly increases residential local prices; (2) monopoly does not help universal service provision and lowers the use of international telephony; and (3) mandatory vertical separation reduces international telephony usage and the number of fixed lines in service. In summary, monopoly and vertical separation harm those consumers that they were precisely designed to help: the downstream (business) users of international telephony and the upstream users of residential local telephony