Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms

A single valuable object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Sprumont, Yves
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 148.2013, 3, p. 1102-1121
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Assignment \| Strategy-proof mechanisms \| Groves mechanisms \| Constrained optimality \| No envy

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665751