Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	SPRUMONT, Yves
Institutions:	Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933666