Contracts for the management of a non-renewable resource under asymmetric information and structural price breaks
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet and Francesco Ricci
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Martimort, David ; Pouyet, Jérôme ; Ricci, Francesco |
| Published in: |
Annals of economics and statistics. - Amiens : GENES, ISSN 2115-4430, ZDB-ID 2588293-4. - Vol. 132.2018, p. 81-103
|
| Subject: | Non-Renewable Resource Management | Delegated Management | Optimal Contract | Asymmetric Information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Erschöpfbare Ressourcen | Exhaustible resources | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Ressourcenökonomik | Resource economics |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012249531