Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.

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Year of publication:	2006-12
Authors:	Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices.
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015216737