Coordination in a Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Gerber, Anke ; Hens, Thorsten ; Vogt, Bodo
Publisher:	Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung <Zürich>
Subject:	Anlageverhalten \| Eingeschränkte Rationalität \| Experimentelle Spieltheorie \| Experimental Economics

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Extent:	67 p. application/pdf
Series:	Universität Zürich - Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung - Working Papers Working Paper Series ; 126 (2004)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	Financial theory ; Game and Bargaining Theory. Other ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005846394