Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games.

In this paper we study exact TU games having finite dimensional non-atomic cores, a class of games that includes relevant economic games. We first characterize them by showing that they are a particular type of market games. Using this characterization, we then show that in such a class the cores are their unique von Neumann- Morgenstern stable sets.

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Year of publication:	2003-03
Authors:	Marinacci, Massimo ; Montrucchio, Luigi
Institutions:	International Centre for Economic Research (ICER)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	32 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005577364