Corporate Governance and the Design of Stock Option Programs

Investors and academics increasingly criticize that features of employee stock option (ESO) programs reflect rent-extraction by managers (managerial power view). The authors use a unique European dataset to investigate the relationship between the design of ESO programs and corporate governance structures.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2005-10-01
Authors:	Sautner, Zacharias ; Weber, Martin
Publisher:	Universität <Mannheim> - Sonderforschungsbereich Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und Ökonomische Modellierung
Subject:	Aktie \| Corporate Governance

More details

Extent:	363520 bytes 44 p. application/pdf
Series:	Universität Mannheim - Sonderforschungsbereich Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und Ökonomische Modellierung - Discussion Papers Discussion Paper ; 05-32
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; Management and business planning. General ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005850456