Corporate network formation in Kuwait: board interlocks network analysis using exponential random graph models

Purpose Interlocking directorates are a common phenomenon across several markets around the world. Yet, the institutional environment and the role of corporate elites in forming board networks promote some developing markets as a unique setting to understand the corporate boards network structure. This study aims to first explore the board directors’ network of all publicly listed companies in Kuwait. This paper then evaluates the effects of exogenous factors and endogenous network structural processes on the likelihood of board interlock. Design/methodology/approach This study analyzes the interlocks network structures of 167 listed companies in 13 different market sectors in Kuwait relying on hand-collected directors’ data and using four measures of network centrality: betweenness, degree, closeness and eigenvector. The authors predict board interlocks using exponential random graph models (ERGM) and firm-level information from the Bloomberg database. Findings This study observes that both the firms and directors’ networks consist of 55 components, with the largest component containing about half of the total number of firms/directors. The firm’s network consists of one giant component of 85 firms, including all but one bank. This study shows the importance of endogenous network variables, such as the number of edges, centralization and triangles on the estimation of the factors that promote the board interlocks. Highly centralized firms are less likely to interlock with other firms, while two firms that are interlocked with a common third firm are more likely to interlock. Originality/value This paper is the first to analyze in-depth the structure of the directors network of companies in Kuwait. This study illustrates the complex map of interfirm and directors social networks in Kuwait. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to exploit ERGM in the context of board interlocks to account for potential cross-dependencies and emergent network structures. Managers can identify the director interlock with other firms in the network and take advantage of the connection as a source of external knowledge and influence.