Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion

I study a multi-player mechanism design problem where the players are able to collude. I characterize the extent that the principal can link the compensation level of one of these players to the production performance of the other. I use this characterization result to identify the optimal contract for a principal with budget constraints.

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Year of publication:	2004-01-23
Authors:	Celik, Gorkem
Institutions:	Vancouver School of Economics
Subject:	Collusion \| Mechanism design

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.ca working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	0 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969873