Covenants Without Swords : Group Identity, Norms, and Communication in Social Dilemmas

In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this "communication effect". One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Bicchieri, Cristina
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Soziale Norm \| Social norm \| Experiment \| Gruppenentscheidung \| Group decision-making \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Soziales Verhalten \| Social behaviour \| Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Soziale Gruppe \| Social group
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Rationality and Society, Vol. 14, No. 02, May 2002 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital ; K00 - Law and Economics. General ; D64 - Altruism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122929